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We examine the effects of foreign entry on productive efficiency during the Polish 
investment liberalization. The performance of foreign acquisitions is compared to foreign 
firms entering the market through greenfield entry, as well as domestic acquisitions of 
privatized firms, domestic greenfields and remaining state-owned (non-privatized) firms 
during the period 1995-2000. We find that foreign privatized firms have realized larger 
productivity gains than all types of domestic firms and that this is not due to higher price-
cost margins, which is consistent with the idea that foreign firms bring in firm-specific 
knowledge. Foreign greenfields have the highest average labour productivity, while 
foreign privatizations show the largest productivity increase. 
 
JEL Classification: F23, J31 
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1 Introduction 
        During the last decades we have witnessed large privatization and deregulation 
programmes all over the world.
1 2 In the policy debate, it has been put forward that 
participation by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the privatization and liberalization 
process is beneficial. First, entry by MNEs is seen as a way of raising employment and 
investments, but also as leading to the use of new, or better, technology. Second, entry by 
MNEs may challenge established (domestic) oligopolies by creating effective local 
rivals.
3 
        However, there is also a concern that these foreign direct investments (FDI) are 
motivated by market power, or short-term gains. In particular, if foreign entry takes place 
through an acquisition of a local firm rather than through greenfield entry (where a new 
venture is setup), there is a concern that foreign entry might not increase the productive 
capacity and thus, lead to lower consumer welfare due to increased market power, and 
even increased unemployment through lay-offs.
4 5 
    In this paper, we examine the efficiency effects of foreign entry during the Polish 
investment liberalization in the 1990s. To explore the effects of foreign ownership and 
                                                 
1 Privatization and deregulation activities are driven by factors such as a general trend of reducing the state 
in the economy, budgetary constraints, a need for attracting investments and a combination of technological 
change, liberalization and globalization of product and financial markets (Bortolotti et al (2003) and 
(OECD, 2000). 
2 Many countries also announce substantial forthcoming privatizations. Planned privatizations suggest that 
the privatization proceeds will remain strong through continued activities in Europe and Asia. Examples of 
countries with large privatization plans are China, Japan, Portugal, Thailand and Turkey (OECD, 2000). 
3 See Norbäck and Persson (2004, 2005) for theoretical analyses of effects of foreign owners’ participation 
in privatizations. 
4 WIR (2000). For example, the Hungarian authorities argued that a European strategic investor would have 
been interested in running down Ikarus, a Hungarian bus manufacturer, in order to eliminate a competitor 
(Financial Times, July 2, 1991)]. 
5 Moreover, some countries restrict the right of foreign individuals and firms to acquire domestic firms, or 
apply special restrictions on foreign firms in certain industries. This is the case in Malaysia and the 
Republic of Korea, for example. But the practice of countries in this respect has also changed over time. For 
instance, by May 1998, restrictions on foreign acquisitions of domestic shares in the stock market and 
restrictions on M&As by foreigners in the Republic of Korea had been abolished. However, the new 
investment policy still favours greenfield investment through, for instance, different tax treatments of M&A 
investments (WIR, 2000).   4
entry mode, we compare the performance of foreign acquisitions of privatized firms with 
foreign firms entering the market through greenfield entry, as well as with domestic 
acquisitions of privatized firms, domestic greenfield entry and remaining state-owned 
(non-privatized) firms. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to allow for 
such a breakdown of firm types.
6 
    The Polish economy provides a natural experiment for such an analysis. Poland was 
one of the first Eastern European countries to embark on the reform trail when initiating 
its “Big Bang” reforms in January 1990.
7 The initial actions were to deregulate prices and 
introduce foreign competition to many industries as well as to send signals of tight 
monetary and fiscal policies in the future.
8 Privatization of state-owned firms was not part 
of the “Bang”, however, but was implemented gradually. In fact, Poland has been among 
the slowest to privatize, still retaining a relatively large number of state-owned firms. The 
privatization process tended to favour so-called insider ownership and domestic owners,
9 
but a substantial number of state-owned firms were also opened to foreign purchase. 
Poland is also at the top in the category of creation of new firms.
10 Consequently, using 
data from Poland, we can compare the effects on efficiency and market power of different 
types of ownership. Moreover, while recent empirical evidence shows the impact of 
privatization on firms’ productivity in transition countries to mainly have been positive, it 
has also been acknowledged that the positive impact has taken time.
11 
    The present study uses average labour productivity as a performance measure, and 
regresses it on ownership types, capital intensity, market share, import competition and 
                                                 
6 Many studies of privatization only focus on two types of ownership, insiders and outsiders. Insiders then 
refer to employees in the previously state-owned firms; see e.g. Frydman et al. (1999). We do not make this 
comparison, but focus on the foreign or domestic and privatization or greenfield dimensions. 
7 Sachs (1993). 
8  Bartel and Harrison (2005) also show that when increasing public efficiency, these types of reforms may 
be a substitute for privatizations. See also Megginson and Netter (2001).  
9 Estrin (2002). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.   5
tariff barriers. Our statistical analysis confirms the already well-known fact that foreign 
firms have a higher average labour productivity than domestic firms, in particular the 
remaining state-owned firms.
12 If the higher productivity for foreign firms is due to 
higher efficiency, this is likely to benefit the host country through lower consumer prices 
(or higher quality of goods), but if the superiority manifests itself through increased 
market power and higher prices, it will hurt domestic consumers.
13 
  Therefore, in addition to controlling for a rich array of firm types, we also try to 
control for the potential bias in the productivity measure which stems from increased 
prices instead of increased efficiency. An indication that market power explains a higher 
labour productivity in foreign firms would be that foreign firms with high labour 
productivity also have a high (average) price-cost margin. This procedure then eliminates 
the difference in productivity found among the ownership categories: Domestic 
Greenfield, Domestic Privatization and State-owned, whereas the difference in 
productivity found among the ownership categories: FDI Privatization, FDI Greenfield 
and State-owned remains significant. This suggests that labour productivity in foreign 
firms is not inflated by high market power induced by FDI, and if pricing behaviour is not 
controlled for, the differences in labour productivity between foreign and domestic firms 
may be under-estimated. 
  The limitations of the present analysis should also be discussed. We should be cautious 
in interpreting the results as causal effects of privatization. For instance, it may be the 
case that the most efficient firms were privatized and that it is the firm-specific assets of 
these firms that explain the higher productivity in private-owned firms. This is the well-
                                                 
12 Djankov and Murrell (2002). 
13 In a recent study, using very detailed data from Bulgaria and Romania, Konings et al. (2004) find that 
privatized firms with foreign owners are associated with higher price-cost margins and that the effects of 
privatization are stronger in highly competitive sectors, suggesting that privatizations result in cost-cutting 
by the new owners. However, they do not distinguish between acquisition entry and greenfield entry, which 
is the focus of our study.   6
known possibility of a selection bias in studies of privatizations, i.e., that the state has 
chosen to privatize the most productive firms first in order to get a high price, or maintain 
a good reputation. One way of partially controlling for this problem would be to examine 
the pre- and post performance of privatized firms acquired by foreign and domestic 
firms.
14 This is, unfortunately, not possible in our setting since we do not have any data 
on the privatized firms prior to privatization. However, while we cannot isolate the causal 
effect of a privatization in general, our data can still provide valuable information on the 
effects of allowing foreign ownership of privatized assets, due to the availability of 
multiple control groups. Greenfield entry may then be thought of as an alternative 
privatization method, as suggested by Brada (1996) and discussed in Megginson and 
Netter (2001), since the start-up of new firms also changes the economy’s ownership 
structure. Thus, the effect of foreign ownership can then be compared within privatized 
firms, within firms established through greenfield entry, as well as between entry modes 
of private firms.
 15 
  With some caution, we would therefore argue that our results are consistent with the 
idea that foreign owners bring in firm-specific assets which are combined with the local 
assets and thus, these firms become more efficient.
16 We do not only find a significant 
                                                 
14 This is the approach taken by Megginson et al. (1994). See also the discussion of this approach in 
Megginson and Netter (2001). 
15 With pre-and post privatization data, a difference-in-difference method combined with matching 
techniques can also be used to estimate the causal effects of foreign ownership. This has recently been 
applied in work on cross-border acquisitions. For some examples, see Arnold and Javorcek (2005), Girma 
and Görg (2002), Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) and Csengödi et al. (2006). However, we should note that 
this method would only be applicable to acquisitions of state-owned firms since, by definition, there exists 
no “pre-period” for greenfield investments. 
16 MNEs are typically leading firms in their respective industries and possess firm-specific knowledge in 
terms of technology or know-how of the organization of production and marketing (see Barbaretta and 
Venables, 2004; Caves, 1995; and Markusen, 1995, 2002). Thus, foreign ownership can result in a more 
efficient use of local assets. This is formalized in Norbäck and Persson (2007) which develops a theoretical 
model where foreign firms can enter into an oligopolistic industry either by acquiring a local firm and 
investing sequentially, or by directly setting up a new plant, i.e. greenfield entry. They show that for a 
foreign acquisition to take place, the acquiring foreign firm must be sufficiently efficient when using the 
domestic assets. Put differently, there is a lower limit on how inefficient a foreign acquirer can be when 
using the acquired assets. The reason is that if a foreign acquisition is mainly driven by the desire to 
eliminate a local rival in order to increase product market prices, this will imply that rivals in the market   7
productivity differential between foreign and domestic privatizations − there is also a 
significant productivity differential between foreign and domestic greenfield investments. 
Moreover, these differences are not explained by higher price-cost margins, thereby 
suggesting a more efficient use of the assets from foreign ownership. We control for fixed 
industry, time and regional effects in our regressions and find that our results still hold. 
This suggests that the higher productivity of foreign firms is not due to foreign firms 
being overrepresented in high-productivity industries or regions.  
We also address the concern about foreign acquisitions in the privatization and 
liberalization programmes that, in contrast to greenfield FDI, they do not increase the 
productive capacity and might lead to lower consumer welfare and lay-offs. Our 
statistical analysis then shows that foreign greenfield investment indeed has a higher 
productivity than foreign acquisitions. However, our analysis also indicates that the 
productivity increase is highest in foreign privatizations. Consequently, even though 
foreign greenfield has the highest level of productivity, foreign privatized firms are 
improving the most. Once more this indicates that transfers of ownership of state 
enterprises to foreign firms are associated with asset complementarities between MNEs’ 
firm-specific assets and acquired state assets and that the associated dynamic effects are 
important for determining the welfare effects. 
    The paper is organized as follows: We start by a purely descriptive statistical analysis 
of the data used; firms are classified according to ownership types and compared with 
respect to average labour productivity, capital intensity, average wages paid etc. A 
preliminary discussion about the extent of market power is also conducted. This section is 
followed by an econometric study where we try to explain the differences in average 
                                                                                                                                                  
will also have an incentive to expand their business which will reduce the profitability of the acquisition. 
Thus, the complementarities or synergies arising from a change of ownership need to be sufficiently large. 
The empirical results in this paper are thus consistent with such synergies. 
   8
labour productivity across ownership types as well as to disentangle the simultaneity 
relationship between productivity and market power, the latter proxied by the average 
price-cost margin. We follow up by a discussion about the interpretation of our results. 
 
2  Privatization in Poland 
    Poland’s  transition  to  a  market  economy started in January 1990 by lifting state-
controlled prices on most goods according to the so-called Balcerowicz plan. In July 
1990, the Law on Privatization of State-owned Enterprises was passed and a new ministry 
(the “Ministry of Privatization”) in charge of privatizations was formed in September the 
same year. The first privatizations took place late in 1990. The ambition of the first 
government in charge of the transition was to introduce private ownership as soon as 
possible.
17 One reason for the sense of urgency was that so-called “spontaneous” or 
“nomenklatura” privatizations had become a major concern. Another concern was to limit 
the power of workers’ councils in state-owned firms, which was seen by the liberal 
government as conservative forces intent on resisting restructurings which threatened 
layoffs of workers.
18 19 The first three years of privatization also saw a relatively rapid 
pace in the ownership transformation. However, there was a backlash in 1994, with a 
new, left-wing government coming in, which wanted to slow down the process. Special 
interest groups, such as trade-unions in heavy-industry sectors (which contained many 
very large state-owned companies), also wanted things to slow down. Attitudes changed 
in 1996 and the privatization process once more picked up speed. The result was that by 
                                                 
17 Blaszczyk (1999). 
18 Frydman et al. (1993). 
19 Squires Meaney (1997).   9
the turn of the century, some sectors were almost completely privatized while others were 
still dominated by state-owned firms, or firms belonging to NIFs. 
    The sectors which still remained essentially in the state domain by the end of 1998 
were oil and coal products, metal production, electricity, water and gas supply, mining 
and quarrying, and transport, storage and communications. The state’s share of the assets 
in these few sectors was between 90 and 100 per cent, but if a few other large sectors are 
included, such as the automobile industry, apparel, machinery and equipment and food 
and beverages, the state’s share falls to about 45 per cent.
20 Therefore, we conclude that 
by the middle of our observation period (1995-2000), the privatization process had come 
quite far in some industries, while it had virtually stood still in others. The reason for this 
uneven pattern was probably mainly political constraints, particularly the resistance of 
powerful interest groups in heavy industry and mining sectors. Nevertheless, the 
privatization process had produced a useful variation across industries with respect to 
ownership structures, of which we will try to take advantage in order to address the 
question of the connection between foreign entry, efficiency and competition. 
 
3  Preliminary Analysis of Data 
    The data is described in this section. The preliminary data analysis is used to establish 
the salient facts of the sampled firms, and set the stage for the deeper econometric 
analysis to follow. 
        To identify the firms that might be suitable to include in our study, we used a 
comprehensive Polish database (“Teleadreson”) which contains information about the 
size of the firms (turnover or number of employees), production activities (NAICS- and 
                                                 
20 Blaszczyk (1999).   10
SIC-codes), ownership category, and date of foundation. The data for individual firms in 
this database was mostly from 1999, but some was from 2000. This database was used to 
identify the ten largest firms in each four-digit (SIC) industry according to the number of 
employees, given that the smallest firm contained at least 100 employees.
21 
Since there were some missing observations on the number of employees, the database 
was also sorted by turnover (for each industry), and the ten firms with the largest turnover 
were identified. Focusing on the manufacturing and mining sectors, the number of four-
digit SIC-industries became 408, but only a few of these industries actually had ten or 
more firms with at least 100 employees. The number of firms identified in this first stage 
was 1,619. The total number of employees within the sampled firms was about 1.91 
million. In 1998, total employment in manufacturing, mining and quarrying, the sectors 
which most closely cover the sector used in the sample, was 2.56 million;
22 the firms 
included in this database therefore comprise about 75 per cent of the total employment of 
all firms. 
    Table 3.1 contains a description of the number of firms in each ownership category and 
their average sizes in 1999/2000. Of the total number of firms in the sample, 38.3 per cent 
were still state-owned, 6.7 per cent were foreign owned, privatized firms and 18.2 per 
cent were privatized firms with domestic (Polish) owners. The transition, and 
privatization, process started in 1990 and since then, there has been a steady formation of 
new firms. By 1999 there were 409 newly established firms that met the selection criteria, 
i.e., firms which were privately owned and not privatized formerly state-owned firms 
with at least 100 employees and among the ten largest firms in their respective four-digit 
SIC-industry. 27.6 per cent of these were foreign owned (so-called greenfields). The 
                                                 
21 This was done since the Amadeus database, which we use to obtain accounting data, only contains 
information on firms of medium or large size. 
22 Tabl. 5 (154), in Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland, 1999.   11
respective average sizes of the still state-owned and privatized formerly state-owned 
firms were quite similar, while domestic greenfield firms were much smaller than the 
corresponding foreign-owned firms. 
 
[Table 3.1 about here] 
 
        To obtain more useful economic data, we used the Amadeus database
23 to get 
accounting data for as many of the firms identified in the first stage as possible. Table 3.2 
shows the number of firms, total employment and average size of the subset of firms 
identified from Amadeus. A comparison of Tables 3.2 and 3.1 shows an overall coverage 
in the Amadeus database of 69.4 per cent of the firms identified through Teleadreson. The 
highest degree of coverage is for the first three ownership categories (80 per cent, 77 per 
cent and 74 per cent, respectively), while it is lower for the last two categories (57 per 
cent and 69 per cent); in terms of the number of firms identified. As can be seen from the 
last lines of Tables 3.2 and 3.1, the firms selected into the Amadeus database are close, in 
terms of average size, to the firms in the Teleadreson database. Therefore, we are 
confident that our sample is representative of the population. 
 
 
[Table about 3.2 here] 
                                                 
23 AMADEUS stands for “Analyse major databases from European sources”, and is produced by Bureau 
van Dijk Electronic Publishing. It contains economic information from about five million European 
companies.   12
3a Firm Type and Productivity 
    We first want to find out whether there are any differences in the level of average 
labour productivity among various types of firms, where type is defined on basis of 
ownership. In particular, is there any difference between domestic firms with private 
owners and foreign owners? Are newly started firms (so-called greenfields) more 
productive than older, privatized firms? Our reference will be older non-privatized, i.e. 
still state-owned, firms. The natural prior belief is that the latter firms are the least 
productive since the government has probably chosen to privatize the “best” firms first; 
the remaining firms may be loss-making and/or in a state of reconstruction in order to be 
privatized subsequently. 
    Making use of the Amadeus data, we derive a measure of average labour productivity 
for each firm and year. We call this variable ALP and construct it by using information on 
total sales, S, minus total cost of production, TC (excl. financial costs) and add labour 
cost, LC; all variables expressed in current local currency. Labour cost was missing for 
roughly half the sampled firms and therefore, we use average, yearly wage levels at the 
three-digit level, multiplied by the number of workers in each firm, to get an approximate 
measure of labour cost for the missing firms. Thus, the average labour productivity for 










Table 3.3 contains the ratio of the mean of this variable for each ownership category 
divided by the mean for state-owned firms, for each year. These numbers are given as an   13
aggregate for all sectors and are broken down into three broadly defined sectors (raw 
material industries, consumer goods industries and industrial goods industries) 
 
[Table 3.3 about here] 
 
    The numbers indicate that foreign-owned firms, both privatized firms and greenfields, 
have the highest relative labour productivity, while domestic greenfields are more 
productive than state-owned or domestic privatized firms. For example, in Table 3.3 the 
number 1.36 in 1995 for foreign privatized firms in the “All industries” part of the table 
indicates that they had 36 per cent higher average labour productivity than state-owned 
firms in that year. The category “Foreign Greenfields” has the highest relative labour 
productivity, but also contains the fewest observations. The last row shows the average 
proportions in the sample for each category over the entire observation period. Note that 
the 45 per cent for state-owned firms is the same proportion as that reported by Blaszczyk 
(1999) for the proportion of state-owned assets as of 1998, for roughly the same 
industries as those we include. 
    The higher average labour productivity in privatized firms in general may be due to the 
fact that the state chose to privatize the “best” (or least inefficient) firms first. 
Alternatively, it found no buyer that was prepared to pay the state’s reservation price for 
the least inefficient firms. The higher productivity in greenfield firms indicates that newer 
technology is used, which improves labour productivity. Foreign greenfields (even 
though not so prevalent in the sample) show the highest labour productivity by far. This 
may indicate that foreign firms have access to superior technology, which they use when 
building plants from scratch. That foreign greenfield investments exhibit higher   14
productivity than state-owned companies privatized into foreign owners may also be due 
to restrictions on firing workers during the privatization process. It is also possible that 
foreign firms are more common in industries which are capital intensive and therefore 
have a higher labour productivity. Table 3.3 also shows that there are differences between 
different industrial sectors. The relative superiority of foreign firms is most pronounced in 
consumer goods industries, followed by industrial goods industries. Foreign presence is 
the lowest in the raw material sector and average labour productivity is sometimes even 
lower than in state-owned firms. However, as can be seen in the table, the average 
number of firms is around 50 and of these only 2 per cent are privatized.. The absence of 
foreign firms in the raw material sector reflects the fact that privatizations in this sector in 
general, and to foreign owners in particular, has been the most politically sensitive. 
    Table 3.4 shows the ratio of a measure of the physical capital stock to the number of 
employees (K/L), relative to the same ratio in state-owned firms. It is obvious that foreign 
firms (both privatized and greenfields) have a considerably higher K/L-ratio than 
domestic firms (either private or state-owned firms). Hence, it is possible that foreign 
firms augment the capital stock while also bringing in new technology (embodied in the 
capital goods), which explains the higher labour productivity. There is also a marked 
increase in capital intensity among foreign firms established through privatization. This 
may mirror increased capital investment over the sample period.
24 
 
                                                 
24 It should be pointed out that firms’ real capital stocks could be severely mismeasured in the accounting 
data used. We do not have any information about the quality of Polish accounting standards, so we do not 
have any prior beliefs about the direction of possible biases in the measures. From Table 3.4 we note that 
both categories of domestic firms have (mostly) a lower capital-labour ratio than state-owned firms, while 
both types of foreign firms have a consistently higher ratio, which furthermore is of the same order of 
magnitude. We think that these numbers indicate that there is no systematic bias which overestimates the 
capital-intensity of foreign firms vis-à-vis domestic firms. It is still possible that the remaining state-owned 
firms have too low a recorded capital stock. With this caveat in mind, we still conclude that the results in 
Table 3.4 indicate that foreign firms use different technologies than domestic firms, in particular state-
owned firms.   15
               [Table 3.4 about here] 
 
    The sectoral break-down shows the same pattern as for average labour productivity; the 
relative superiority of foreign firms is most pronounced in the consumer and industrial 
goods sectors. It is also of interest to see whether foreign firms pay higher wages than 
domestic firms. Table 3.5 gives the wage levels relative to the average wage in state-
owned firms. As previously discussed, we have much fewer observations here, since 
individual labour cost data is missing for a majority of the firms in each year. It is notable 
that domestic private firms do not differ considerably from state-owned firms, but foreign 
firms have a significantly higher wage level, in both privatized and greenfield firms. 
Apart from foreign greenfields in the raw material sector (which we have noted have very 
few observations), foreign firms pay higher wages in all sectors. An explanation for this 
is that foreign firms hire more highly educated, and therefore more expensive, workers 
with the skills to work with the more advanced capital equipment. To find out whether 
this is indeed the case, we should ideally add a proxy for human capital-intensity to our 
later regression equations. Unfortunately, such proxies, e.g. the average years of 
schooling of employees, are not available in the databases used and therefore, this 
question cannot be resolved here. An alternative explanation, which we cannot disprove 
either, is that foreign firms pay higher wages to induce a higher work effort, in line with 
efficiency wage theory arguments. This could also be a partial explanation for their 
higher average labour productivity.
25  
 
             [ Table 3.5 about here] 
                                                 
25  It is well-known in the literature that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than domestically owned 
ones. For instance, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) find foreign ownership in Indonesia to be associated with 
paying higher wages, even when controlling for plant-level characteristics as well as for educational 
characteristics of workers.    16
 
 
3b Firm Type and Price-cost Margins 
    Apart from higher capital-intensity (real and/or human), another explanation for the 
higher measured average labour productivity is that foreign firms enjoy some degree of 
market power in the host country market. Our measure of average labour productivity is 
constructed from firms’ sales figures which are the product of price and quantity. If a firm 
gains market power, it can increase its sales in value terms by increasing the price and 
reducing the quantity sold. Higher average labour productivity, and sales, in foreign-
owned firms may therefore be due to market power instead of higher efficiency in the use 
of resources. Since prices set by individual firms are not available, it is difficult to 
explicitly test this hypothesis. 
    An ideal measure of market power is the Lerner index, i.e. the markup of prices over 
marginal cost. However, we do not have enough information to estimate cost functions 
and marginal costs. Instead, we use the average price-cost margin, i.e. price minus 
average total cost divided by price, or sales minus total cost of production divided by 
sales, as an admittedly imperfect measure of market power. Our measure of the (average) 
markup, or price-cost margin is 
 








Table 3.6 shows how this measure of market power has developed over the observation 
period for the different ownership types, once more relative to state-owned firms. 
   17
                                                       [Table 3.6 about here] 
 
    Both foreign privatized and domestic firms of both types have had a consistently higher 
price-cost margin than state-owned firms over the whole period. Foreign greenfields 
show a pattern of increasing margins over time. The pattern is most uneven within the 
raw material sector, while it seems that foreign privatized firms have the lowest margins 
as compared to the other types in the industrial goods sector. 
    One explanation for the higher efficiency of foreign firms could be the exercise of 
market power. In the next section, we will analyse the simultaneous determination of 
labour productivity and price cost margins, but as a preliminary step we consulted the 
Polish Statistical Yearbook to get information about how relative prices for various goods 
had changed over the observation period. In the statistical yearbook, we found prices for a 
large number of products, but only a small subset fitted into the industrial classification 
used in constructing the database of firm information. The relative price changes in the 
selected industries (relative to the general change in consumer and producer prices) are 
shown in Table 3.7, together with market shares for the three ownership types. From this 
table, we calculated the correlation coefficients between relative price changes and 
market shares for State, Foreign and Domestic, with the following results: State: 0.47, 
Foreign: –0.22 and Domestic: –0.35. This evidence suggests that prices have increased 
more in markets dominated by still state-owned firms. This lends some support to the 
view that the high margins enjoyed by private firms (of all types) is more a result of rapid 
productivity improvements than the exercise of market power. 
 
 
   18
                                                          [Table 3.7 about here] 
  
 
4 Econometric  analysis 
4a Examining average labour productivity 
    We start by specifying a regression equation to examine differences in average labour 
productivity between the five ownership types. To avoid sector-specific disturbances, we 
estimate fixed-effect regressions controlling for industry-specific effects at the four-digit 
level (for 315 industries), regional-specific effects (for 16 regions) and time-specific 
effects (for 7 years). The first specification of average labour productivity regressions is: 
 
 
[] 3 4 3 2 1 0 it r t j i i i i it FDIP FDIG DP DG ALP ε α α α α α α α α + + + + + + + + =
 
where ALPit is defined in Equation (1). Once more, we calculate average, yearly wage 
levels at the three-digit level for firms with missing wage costs. However, since we noted 
above that foreign firms pay higher wages than domestic firms, we calculate these 
average industry wages separately for foreign and domestic firms. DGi, DPi, FDIGi and 
FDIPi are dummy variables indicating ownership types. DG stands for Domestic 
Greenfield, DP stands for Domestic Privatization, FDIG stands for FDI Greenfield and 
FDIP stands for FDI Privatization. Since we use state-owned firms as the reference, these 
coefficients tell us how much, on average, labour productivity differs between a specific 
ownership type and state-owned firms. Industry, time and regional fixed-effects are   19
captured by the terms αj, αt and αr. By including fixed-effects, we hope to isolate the pure 
effect of ownership type on labour productivity; a higher ALP in foreign firms could be 
due to the clustering of such firms in particularly profitable and growing sectors and/or a 
timing effect meaning that entry of foreign firms has occurred at beneficial times, for 
example. 
    Equation (1) is our basic regression equation, which we expand by gradually including 
additional control variables. The final specification of the regression equation is: 
 
  ) 4 ( 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
it r t j jt it it
i i i i it
Tariff KL MS
FDIP FDIG DP DG ALP
ε α α α α α α
α α α α α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
 
 
where subscript i stands for an individual firm, subscript j stands for the four-digit 
Primary US-SIC industry and t is year t. The control variables are: the firm market share 
of domestic production, MSit, the capital-labour ratio, KLit and tariff rates, Tariffjt. Tariff 
data is from Jon Haveman  and indicates the average tariff rates at the industry level.
 26 
    The results of (2) are presented in Table 4.1. Specification (i) confirms the results from 
the preliminary statistical analysis in Table 3.3. FDI Greenfield had on average about 
45200 Zloty higher average labour productivity than state-owned firms. All ownership 
types but Domestic Privatization have a significantly higher average labour productivity 
than state-owned firms, with the ranking from the highest to the lowest being: FDI 
Greenfield, FDI Privatization, Domestic Greenfield and Domestic Privatization, which is 
confirmed by Wald tests. Thus, when controlling for industry, time and region 
                                                 
26 These data are available at 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html.   20
characteristics, we do not find that firms being privatized to domestic owners have a 
higher labour productivity than state firms, while there is a positive significant difference 
for the remaining types. 
 
                                                       [Table 4.1 about here] 
 
Specification (ii) controls for capital intensity. As we would expect from the preliminary 
analysis in Section 3a, there is a significant, positive relationship between KL and ALP. 
The differences in ALP between state-owned firms and other firms are reduced; mostly so 
for foreign firms of both types. Hence, a large part of the higher ALP in foreign firms can 
be explained by higher capital intensity. Note, however, that the relative ranking of 
ownership types is not affected. 
    Specifications (iii) and (iv) add market shares of domestic production for each firm and 
tariff rates at the three-digit industry level, respectively. These variables are included to 
control for market power effects which could bias ALP upwards. Both variables have 
significantly positive effects on ALP, as expected but, once more, the rankings among all 
types of firms are not greatly affected.
27 
                                                 
27 Note that adding these controls substantially reduces the difference in productivity between state-owned 
firms and foreign firms, while having no effect on the difference in productivity between state-owned firms 
and domestic private firms. This suggests that the difference in labour productivity between foreign firms 
and domestic firms is reduced when control variables are included. We should emphasize that this does not 
imply that foreign ownership becomes less important in a host-country perspective. To see this, define the 
unconditional average difference as the average differences in productivity between foreign and domestic 
firms obtained in equation (3), where no control variables are added. Then define the conditional average 
difference as the average difference in productivity between foreign and domestic firms in equation (4), 
where control variables are added to the regression.  Note that the conditional difference tells us how large 
the average productivity difference is between a foreign firm and a domestic firm with the same 
capital/labour ratio and the same market share. If we believe that domestic firms do not have access to the 
same amount of capital, or the same type of firm-specific assets (as manifested through the size of the 
market shares) as the foreign firms, the unconditional average difference may be a more relevant policy 
measure. For a more elaborate discussion of so-called “conditional and unconditional effects” of foreign 
ownership, see Barba Navaretta and Venables (2004), Chapter 7. 
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    In Table 4.2, we check that the results do not change when only using observations 
where firms report both labour costs and employment numbers, remembering that for 
firms with missing labour cost information, we replaced wages with the average wage by 
industry paid by foreign and domestic firms, respectively. While this generates a smaller 
sample, the results are qualitatively similar and we conclude that approximating wages 
from industry data does not bias the results. In the remaining parts of the paper, we 
therefore use the wider sample. In unreported results, we also estimated (4) on a yearly 
basis to control for firm types being identified in the latter part of the sample period of 
1995-2000, while we use data for the full period. This did not qualitatively change our 
results. We also used total factor productivity as an alternative dependent variable. Once 
more, there was no qualitative change in the results. 
 
                                                       [Table 4.2 about here] 
 
    The evidence so far points in the direction of foreign firms, of both types, being more 
productive than state-owned firms and in most specifications also more productive than 
private domestic firms (of both types). 
    These  results  indicate  that  ownership  identity and entry mode indeed affect the 
productivity of a firm. However, these results could, of course, be due to special initial 
conditions or restrictions on specific owners or entry mode, which would explain the 
result. For instance, it might be the case that foreign owners are not more efficient but 
only participate when efficient firms are privatized. Or it could be the case that when 
acquiring a firm, the government puts more restrictions on the firm, such as employment 
guarantees, as compared to the case with greenfield entry.   22
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Using the same sequential approach as in the levels-specifications, the results in Table 4.3 
indicate that the productivity increase is highest in Foreign Privatizations. This is the only 
ownership category which seems to have significantly higher increases in ALP than 
State-owned firms. For example, even though Foreign Greenfields have the highest 
absolute productivity, Foreign Privatized firms seem to be improving the most. This 
indicates that transfers of ownership of state enterprises to foreign firms have dynamic 
productivity effects. Thus, a foreign acquisition could in the long run lead to larger gains 
in productivity than greenfield entry, when complementarities arising from combining 




                                                       [Table 4.3 about here] 
 
 
                                                 
28 We cannot apply firm fixed effects when estimating the effect on firm type on the level of average labour 
productivity in (4) since, by definition, there is no change in status for firms started by greenfield entry over 
time. In addition, most privatized firms have been included in the Amadeus database after privatization. 
Consequently, there are only a few firms where we have data before and after a privatization.   23
4b Examining Price-cost Margin and Firm Type 
 
    The preceding section suggests that foreign entry should be beneficial since domestic 
assets become more efficiently employed under foreign ownership. However, in order to 
make this conclusion, we ought to address the problem that high labour productivity may 
be due to high mark-up due to market power. 
    To estimate the average price-cost margin, we use the following specification: 
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where the dependent variable is calculated from equation (2). Equation (6) contains the 
same variables as those used in the ALP-regressions (except the wage level), and in 
addition, TFit, which is tangible fixed assets for firm i in period t, and 
2
it TF , which is the 
square of the same variable. We include the square of TFA to pick up potential scale 
effects, which would result in higher price-cost margins for firms with larger plant sizes. 
        Table 4.4 presents the regression results on PCM, where specification (i) directly 
estimates equation (6). For comparison, we also include the ALP-regression using 
specification (iv) from Table 4.1, here re-labelled as specification (ii). Then, we continue 
by simultaneously estimating the PCM- and ALP-equations (4) and (6). This is done, in 
specification (iii), in order to correct for simultaneity between PCM and ALP arising from 
price-setting behaviour by firms with market power. The simultaneous equation system   24
was estimated using 3SLS. From (i), we can see that the differences in PCM are quite 
small among private firms, even though (with the exception of Foreign Privatizations) 
they are significantly higher than those for state-owned firms. Controlling for the 
simultaneity between PCM and ALP in (iii) reduces both for all firms. However, while 
there is still a significant positive difference in ALP between foreign firms of both types, 
this difference disappears for domestic firms where we find that, controlling for pricing 
behaviour, Domestic Privatizations have an even significantly lower ALP than State-
owned firms. Conversely, price-cost margins are now not significantly higher for foreign 
firms, as compared to State-owned firms, while it remains higher for both types of 
domestic firms. From the simultaneously estimated regressions, it appears that the 
difference in productivity found between the ownership categories Domestic Greenfield, 
Domestic Privatization and State-owned can be explained by differences in price-cost 
margin, but the difference in productivity found among FDI Privatization, FDI Greenfield 
and State-owned cannot be explained in this way. 
        Hence, not controlling for pricing behaviour, the differences in labour productivity 
between foreign and domestic firms are under-estimated. This seems to counter our prior 
of labour productivity in foreign firms being inflated by high market power induced by 
FDI.   
 
                                                       [Table 4.4 about here] 
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5 Conclusions 
    In this paper, we have found some evidence of foreign ownership of privatized firms 
and the entry of new foreign firms in Polish manufacturing industries having led to real 
productivity gains. The higher measured labour productivity is not due to higher price-
cost margins which would have been negative for Polish consumers.
29 
   We have also addressed the concern about foreign acquisitions in the privatization and 
liberalization programmes that, in contrast to greenfield FDI, they do not increase the 
productive capacity and might lead to lower consumer welfare and lay-offs. Our 
statistical analysis shows that foreign greenfield investments indeed have a higher 
productivity than foreign acquisitions. However, our analysis also indicates that the 
productivity increase is highest in foreign privatizations. Consequently, even though 
foreign greenfields have the highest absolute productivity, foreign privatized firms are 
improving the most. This is in contrast to the often held view that FDI by greenfield 
investment should be the preferred mode of entry. Hence, it is important to take into 
account that a foreign acquisition could in the long run lead to larger productivity gains 
when complementarities arising from combining local assets with the firm-specific assets 
of the foreign firm materialize. This, in turn, may also benefit consumers through lower 
prices and higher quality. 
    Finally, an aspect not dealt with is spillovers.
30 In future work, the data employed in 
this study can be used to also examine other effects of foreign entry. For instance, 
governments often promote FDI with the belief that these investments have positive 
externalities on the rest of the economy, i.e., spillovers to other agents in the economy. 
                                                 
29 As discussed in the introduction, some caution should still be exercised when interpreting this as a causal 
relationship, since the effect of foreign ownership is identified through a comparison of the post-greenfield 
and post-acquisition performance of foreign and domestic firms. 
30 For an overview of how domestic firms are affected by the presence of foreign firms, see Görg and 
Greenaway (2004).   26
Whether such spillovers are different for greenfield investments than for investment by 
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Total number of 
employees 
 
805,744 148,570  85,981  329,053  111,698 
Average size  
(employees) 
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1995  622  1  1.36 1.67 1.12 1.64 
1996  853  1  1.68 2.46 1.16 1.49 
1997  1002 1  1.77 2.52 1.23 1.50 
1998  1084 1  1.94 3.69 1.32 1.46 
1999  1073 1  1.78 2.50 1.30 1.28 













Raw material industries 
1995 28  1  1.31  na  1.02  1.02 
1996  44  1  1.48 0.41 1.31 1.02 
1997  51  1  1.26 0.05 0.97 0.81 
1998 60  1  0.95  na  1.15  0.93 
1999  61  1  0.85 0.12 0.83 0.86 













Consumer goods industries 
1995  303  1  1.22 1.34 1.02 1.57 
1996  397  1  1.62 2.27 1.06 1.24 
1997  452  1  1.85 2.90 1.11 1.23 
1998  486  1  2.29 3.33 1.09 1.34 
1999  471  1  1.98 2.82 1.41 1.22 













Industrial goods industries 
1995  291  1  1.52 2.41 1.21 1.73 
1996  412  1  1.65 2.59 1.23 1.76 
1997  499  1  1.64 1.24 1.36 1.82 
1998  538  1  1.57 4.81 1.53 1.61 
1999  541  1  1.68 2.16 1.27 1.39 
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1995  622  1  1.77 3.18 0.89 0.75 
1996  855  1  2.05 2.19 0.89 0.80 
1997  1004 1  2.13 2.26 0.90 0.77 
1998  1084 1  3.08 2.98 0.93 0.90 
1999  1073 1  2.49 2.28 0.82 0.83 













Raw material industries 
1995 27  1  0.92  na  0.63  0.31 
1996  45  1  0.87 1.15 0.38 0.41 
1997  52  1  0.92 0.93 0.36 0.36 
1998  61  1  1.66 2.73 0.37 0.45 
1999  61  1  2.62 0.66 0.34 0.53 













Consumer goods industries 
1995  304  1  1.80 3.45 0.87 0.83 
1996  397  1  2.12 2.56 0.89 0.83 
1997  452  1  2.18 2.22 0.86 0.72 
1998  485  1  3.46 2.73 0.90 0.92 
1999  471  1  3.31 2.37 0.87 0.76 













Industrial goods industries 
1995  293  1  1.85 3.43 0.98 0.75 
1996  413  1  2.31 2.29 0.97 0.84 
1997  500  1  2.33 2.96 1.02 0.87 
1998  538  1  3.09 4.17 1.04 0.97 
1999  541  1  2.09 2.82 0.87 0.93 
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1995  231  1 1.20 1.43 1.10 1.35 
1996  238  1 1.96 1.58 1.05 0.96 
1997  380  1 1.36 1.27 1.03 1.11 
1998  366  1 1.44 1.52 1.04 1.11 
1999  515  1 1.47 1.41 1.01 0.97 













Raw material industries 
 
1995 13  1  1.11  na  0.97  0.87 
1996  17  1  1.12 na 1.03 na 
1997 20  1  1.30  na  0.95  0.75 
1998  24  1 1.11 0.79 1.32 0.75 
1999  31  1 1.19 0.72 0.96 0.76 













Consumer goods industries 
 
1995  112  1 1.20 1.45 1.00 1.57 
1996  104  1 1.35 1.60 1.03 0.84 
1997  155  1 1.33 1.30 0.95 0.95 
1998  164  1 1.49 1.75 0.98 1.03 
1999  203  1 1.47 1.49 1.01 0.91 













Industrial goods industries 
 
1995  106  1 1.24 1.48 1.23 1.22 
1996  117  1 2.86 1.58 1.14 1.17 
1997  205  1 1.29 1.14 1.14 1.26 
1998  178  1 1.40 1.35 1.12 1.29 
1999  231  1 1.45 1.40 1.04 1.04 
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1995  656  1  1.26 0.95 1.23 1.32 
1996  894  1  1.43 1.42 1.32 1.25 
1997  1012 1  1.60 1.57 1.49 1.53 
1998  1087 1  1.24 1.72 1.24 1.50 
1999  1080 1  1.52 2.18 1.34 1.57 













Raw material industries 
1995 36  1  0.62  na  0.83  1.40 
1996 46  1  2.03  na  3.50  1.58 
1997 51  1  1.67  na  0.90  0.65 
1998 60  1  0.55  na  1.05  1.10 
1999 61  1  0.91  na  0.93  1.29 













Consumer goods industries 
1995  321  1  1.29 0.61 1.26 1.18 
1996  414  1  1.53 1.47 1.51 1.37 
1997  460  1  1.63 1.71 1.66 1.58 
1998  488  1  1.60 1.77 1.21 1.57 
1999  476  1  1.65 2.30 1.51 1.55 














Industrial goods industries 
1995  299  1  1.16 1.71 1.13 1.36 
1996  434  1  1.41 1.74 1.15 1.24 
1997  501  1  1.44 1.43 1.41 1.56 
1998  539  1  0.89 1.90 1.35 1.54 
1999  543  1  1.07 2.89 1.39 1.90 
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Table 3.7  Price changes and ownership type 
  
  Product 
 
 
Relative price  
change (%) 
 
Share of output (%) 
 
HHI (firms) 













Meat 3.70  44  0  56  755 
Sausages 2.38  14.7  18.5  66.8  1660 
Poultry -26.13  32.7  1.4  65.9  1332 
Butter 18.79  0  0  100  3982 
Cheese 3.45  0  25.3  74.7  6216 
Milk 7.70  0  87.7  12.3  4471 
Flour 10.41  100  0  0  2593 
Bread  30.71 42.3  3.6 9.7  3161 
Sugar -12.72  8.4  9.5  82.1  885 
Candy 4.27  25.6  29.7  44.7  1550 
Chocolate 1.96  5  95  0  3831 
Vegetable oil  1.05  37.4  53.4  9.2  2796 
Fats and oils  0.25  55.2  0  44.8  4067 
Malt beverages  19.68  41  45.3  13.6  3021 
Liquor 21.53  95.5  0  4.5  2477 
Canned fish  10.26  22.4  27.6  50  2121 
Roasted coffee  -11.94  16.3  54.4  29.2  2245 
Cigarettes 60.99  3.1  95.9  0.9  2174 
Women’s hosiery  24.49  70.8  0  29.2  5868 
Carpets and rugs  8.73  43.6  0  56.4  2310 
Men’s suits and coats  8.67  42.2  4.1  53.7  910 
Men’s shirts  34.54  41.9  43.6  14.5  3867 
Men’s trousers  4.03  0  56.7  43.3  4551 
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Table 4.1 Estimating average labour productivity (ALP) 
                                   Specifications: 















  (14.29) (12.85)  (11.88)  (11.26) 





  (9.18)  (7.71)  (6.43)  (6.18) 





  (3.96)  (4.87)  (5.31)  (5.43) 
Domestic  Privatized  2.648 1.838 1.538  1.793 
  (1.63)  (1.38)  (1.16)  (1.31) 




   (38.56)  (36.93)  (36.42) 
Market  Share    0.302
*** 0.317
*** 
     (7.75)  (7.77) 
Tariff      0.058
*** 
      (2.23) 
R
2  44.5 62.6 63.4  63.0 
Adj R











Observations 3387 3386 3386  3237 
Note: *, **, *** indicate the significance at the one-percent, five-percent and ten-percent level, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time, industry and 
regional dummies are always included. Industry-specific effects are at the four-digit level (for 315 
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Table 4.2 Estimating average labour productivity (ALP) using only observations with 
complete labour cost information 
  Specifications: 
  (i) (ii)  (iii) (iv) 





  (12.42) (9.51)  (9.10)  (8.20) 





  (5.38)  (7.71)  (2.93)  (2.68) 





  (1.92)  (2.39)  (2.50)  (2.55) 
Domestic  Privatized  -1.823 -0.899 -1.058  0.162 
  (-0.61)  (-1.38)  (-0.38)  (0.06) 




   (13.56)  (13.00)  (36.42) 
Market  Share    0.137
** 0.151
** 
     (1.98)  (2.08) 
Tariff      0.093
* 
      (1.81) 
R2  52.5 58.2 58.3  58.1 











Observations 1610 1610 1609  1529 
Note: *, **, *** indicate the significance at the one-percent, five-percent and ten-percent level, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time, industry and 
regional dummies are always included. Industry-specific effects are at the four-digit level (for 315 
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Table 4.3 Estimating the first-difference of ALP 
  Specifications: 
  (i) (ii)  (iii) (iv) 
FDI Greenfield  7.805
** 2.237  1.298  0.833 
  (2.56) (0.78) (0.46)  (0.29) 





  (2.45) (2.64) (2.64)  (2.62) 
Domestic  Greenfield  2.274 1.750 1.818  1.633 
  (1.24) (1.02) (0.98)  (0.84) 
Domestic Privatized  -0.031  0.280  0.043  0.060 
 (-0.02)  (0.22)  (0.03)  (0.04) 






   (9.20)  (8.88)  (9.04) 
∆ Market Share    0.401
*** 0.516
** 
    (5.61)  (6.52) 
∆ Tariff      0.039 
      ( 1 . 3 6 )  
R
2  15.0 20.1 21.3  22.5 
Adj R






F(industry)  1.05 1.06 1.08  1.10 
Observations 2477 2475 2322  2218 
Note: *, **, *** indicate the significance at the one-percent, five-percent and ten-percent level, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time, industry and 
regional dummies are always included. Industry-specific effects are at the four-digit level (for 315 
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Table 4.4 Estimating average labour productivity and price-cost margins simultaneously 
  Specifications: 
  (i): OLS  (ii): OLS  (iii): 3SLS 
  PCM ALP  PCM ALP 
FDI Greenfield  0.026
** 29.962
*** 0.018  22.506
*** 
  (2.17) (11.20)  (1.31)  (6.83) 
FDI Privatized  0.081  17.052
*** 0.002  15.411
*** 
  (0.58)  (65.18)  (0.17)  (4.62) 




  (3.05)  (5.43)  (3.46)  (-0.12) 
Domestic Privatized  0.024
*** 1.793  0.023
*** -4.148
** 
  (3.70)  (1.31)  (3.51)  (-2.40) 
TFA -0.109
***   -0.105
***  
  (-8.07)    (-11.97)   
TFA
2 0.009
***   0.008
***  
  (7.97)    (9.38)   




  (5.20)  (7.77)  (4.39)  (1.35) 
Capital labour ratio    0.109
***    0.109
*** 
   (36.42)   (30.28) 
PCM     221.150
*** 
     (11.09) 
ALP    0.0003
***  
     (2.20)   
Tariff   0.058
** -0.0005 0.063
** 
   (21.23)  (-0.42)  (2.03) 
R
2  33.5 63.0 35.9 40.3 
Adj R
2  26.1 58.9   0.44 
F 32.47
*** 86.45
***    
χ
2    1732.59
*** 3543.68
*** 
Observations 3384 3237 3235 3235 
Note: *, **, *** indicate the significance at the one-percent, five-percent and ten-percent level, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parenthesis. Unreported time, industry and 
regional dummies are always included. Industry-specific effects are at the four-digit level (for 315 
industries), regional-specific effects are defined for 16 regions.   
 
 